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Election Observers, Election Boycotts, and Competition: Do International Observers Increase the Chances that an Opposition Party Will Boycott the Election?
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Election Boycotts, Election Observers, and Competition:
Do international election observers give parties an incentive to boycott
elections?
Susan Dayton Hyde
Emily Beaulieu
Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego
## email not listed ##
## email not listed ##
Abstract: The interaction between opposition parties and international actors during the volatile democratization process has been seldom studied. This paper explores this relationship from 1990-2000 and finds that, controlling for the level of electoral competition, the presence of international observers increases the probability that an opposition party will choose to boycott the election. We argue that this interaction occurs because opposition parties recognize that, under specific circumstances, an election boycott can draw additional international attention to electoral fraud and serve to discredit an incumbent who is striving to be recognized as democratic.
DRAFT
Please request update before citing.
Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, September 2 - September 5, 2004.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
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Election Boycotts, Election Observers, and Competition:
Do international election observers give parties an incentive to boycott
elections?
Susan Dayton Hyde
Emily Beaulieu
Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego
## email not listed ##
## email not listed ##
Abstract: The interaction between opposition parties and international actors during the volatile
democratization process has been seldom studied. This paper explores this relationship from
1990-2000 and finds that, controlling for the level of electoral competition, the presence of
international observers increases the probability that an opposition party will choose to boycott
the election. We argue that this interaction occurs because opposition parties recognize that,
under specific circumstances, an election boycott can draw additional international attention to
electoral fraud and serve to discredit an incumbent who is striving to be recognized as
democratic.
DRAFT
Please request update before citing.
Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, September 2 - September 5, 2004.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
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