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Unpacking Institutions and Ethnic Conflict: Analyzing Democracy’s Influence on Different Forms of Communal Dissent
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Election Cycles and Ethnic Conflict, page 8
difficult process of trying to secede from or overthrow the government, any election year is likely to be a blip on the screen, changing one set of adversaries for another, but likely making no material difference to insurgency, at least in the short run. On the other hand, we ought to expect that ethnic groups will engage in more protests in an election year and as elections approach, ceteris paribus, because elections involve a variety of events that serve as focal points around which individuals can converge and mobilize as groups. We also expect demonstrations to decline after an election year, if only because it is hard to sustain such efforts and to keep people mobilized, particularly as the ability to influence the government declines after an election.
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Communal strife, on the other hand, is likely to decline in election years and as elections
approach. As attention is diverted toward political competition, individuals and groups are less likely to engage in the relatively dangerous—and diverting—activity of attacking other groups. Indeed, they may be wary of doing so, for fear of creating electoral outcomes that are disadvantageous.
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If communal strife is at all an alternative to protest, then as individuals join
peaceful demonstrations during elections, they should be too preoccupied to engage in violence against other groups. Likewise, after an election, communal conflict is likely to increase as influence wanes, frustration grows, and the risks of upsetting the apple cart decline. Our hypotheses for the impact of election cycles are summarized in Table 4. Table 4: Election Cycles and Ethnic Conflict Form of Conflict
Before Election
Election Year After
Election
Protest Higher
Higher
Lower
Communal Conflict
Lower Lower
Higher
Rebellion - - -
While scholars have periodically considered the relationship of electoral calendars to
business cycles (Alesina and Roubini 1997; Smith 2002), there has been little or no effort to consider how ethnic conflict and elections might interact. Below, we will employ a multivariate model to tease out the various and sometimes complex ways that electoral institutions and electoral cycles affect ethnic unrest. Before we do so, however, it is instructive to consider a simple table detailing the average levels of our three measures of conflict (protest, communal, and anti-government rebellion) at different points in the election cycle. The data on ethnic conflict are based on the Minorities at Risk [MAR] project. Table 5. Levels of Ethnic Conflict During Elections, 1985-1998
Mean Protest
Mean Communal Conflict
Mean Rebellion
Election Year
.46 (.80)
.98 (1.62)
.78 (1.56)
Not An Election Year
.42 (.73)
.89 (1.57)
.74 (1.51)
Standard Deviations in Parentheses
Table 5 indicates that ethnic groups engage in higher levels of all forms of dissent in
election years, although conflict may also be high immediately after elections. It is tempting,
12
Gaubatz (1991) suggests this possibility when indicating that democracies are least accountable shortly after
elections.
13
This expectation runs counter to Horowitz (2001), who includes elections among the many precipitants that might
trigger riots.
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| | Authors: Saideman, Stephen., Lanoue, David., Cox, Amy. and Weeraratne, Suranjan. |
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Election Cycles and Ethnic Conflict, page 8
difficult process of trying to secede from or overthrow the government, any election year is
likely to be a blip on the screen, changing one set of adversaries for another, but likely making
no material difference to insurgency, at least in the short run. On the other hand, we ought to
expect that ethnic groups will engage in more protests in an election year and as elections
approach, ceteris paribus, because elections involve a variety of events that serve as focal points
around which individuals can converge and mobilize as groups. We also expect demonstrations
to decline after an election year, if only because it is hard to sustain such efforts and to keep
people mobilized, particularly as the ability to influence the government declines after an
election.
12
Communal strife, on the other hand, is likely to decline in election years and as elections
approach. As attention is diverted toward political competition, individuals and groups are less
likely to engage in the relatively dangerous—and diverting—activity of attacking other groups.
Indeed, they may be wary of doing so, for fear of creating electoral outcomes that are
disadvantageous.
13
If communal strife is at all an alternative to protest, then as individuals join
peaceful demonstrations during elections, they should be too preoccupied to engage in violence
against other groups. Likewise, after an election, communal conflict is likely to increase as
influence wanes, frustration grows, and the risks of upsetting the apple cart decline. Our
hypotheses for the impact of election cycles are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Election Cycles and Ethnic Conflict
Form of
Conflict
Before
Election
Election Year After
Election
Protest Higher
Higher
Lower
Communal
Conflict
Lower Lower
Higher
Rebellion - - -
While scholars have periodically considered the relationship of electoral calendars to
business cycles (Alesina and Roubini 1997; Smith 2002), there has been little or no effort to
consider how ethnic conflict and elections might interact. Below, we will employ a multivariate
model to tease out the various and sometimes complex ways that electoral institutions and
electoral cycles affect ethnic unrest. Before we do so, however, it is instructive to consider a
simple table detailing the average levels of our three measures of conflict (protest, communal,
and anti-government rebellion) at different points in the election cycle. The data on ethnic
conflict are based on the Minorities at Risk [MAR] project.
Table 5. Levels of Ethnic Conflict During Elections, 1985-1998
Mean Protest
Mean Communal Conflict
Mean Rebellion
Election Year
.46 (.80)
.98 (1.62)
.78 (1.56)
Not An Election Year
.42 (.73)
.89 (1.57)
.74 (1.51)
Standard Deviations in Parentheses
Table 5 indicates that ethnic groups engage in higher levels of all forms of dissent in
election years, although conflict may also be high immediately after elections. It is tempting,
12
Gaubatz (1991) suggests this possibility when indicating that democracies are least accountable shortly after
elections.
13
This expectation runs counter to Horowitz (2001), who includes elections among the many precipitants that might
trigger riots.
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