4
My second hypothesis is that elite attitudes toward war are affected by their perceptions of
their state’s war-history - -whether their state has been the winner or loser, victim or instigator,
occupied or independent. Whether the state’s wars have affected the homeland directly or not
may also be significant, as well as the size of the state and its (perceived) importance in the
international sphere. Thus, the state’s historical self-narrative should be a predictor of differences
in views toward justice in war. Intuitively, states that have been historic victims, especially those
with experiences of occupation, should produce citizens who think that there should be strict
rules on the conduct of war. Presumably, the biggest differences should be between individuals
in different states, and not between individuals within a single state.
3
The independent variables
would include people’s understanding of their own nation’s history and also their understanding
of international relations. This hypothesis draws on the ideas of collective memory and state
role-perceptions. It is suggested by the empirical work of Schuman and Rieger,
4
and the
theoretical work of Ulf Hedetoft,
5
among others. To test this hypothesis, I looked for arguments
that used historical reasoning in the editorials.
Hypothesis 3: Friends and Neighborhoods Matter
My third hypothesis suggests that when judging the justness of a particular war, elites draw on
subjective opinions about the parties involved in the conflict. If they feel “close” to a particular
state for cultural, historical or social reasons, they are more likely to support its side. On the
other hand, elites may perceive certain states as being untrustworthy (for reasons unrelated to the
present conflict), and therefore not support its side (although they may not necessarily support
the other either). This suggests that it is not only a state’s war-history that matters, but also its
other relationships with other states, and the ways those ties are perceived socially. To examine
this hypothesis, I collected data both on the editorials’ attitude toward the United States
3
This hypothesis involves three related assumptions. First, that states (via the media/education system) produce
narratives that are concise and stable enough to be identified. Second, that individuals (sub-consciously) absorb
ideas about their state’s narrative or role in international relations and/or history via the media/educational system.
And third, that enough individuals absorb a single, dominant narrative so that there is consensus in the public about
the state’s narrative/role.
4
Howard Schuman and Caryl Rieger. “Historical Analogies, Generational Effects, and Attitudes Toward War,”
American Sociological Review, 57(3), June 1992, pp. 315-326. See also Dean Keith Simonton, “The Sociopolitical
Context of Philosophical Beliefs: A Transhistorical Causal Analysis,” Social Forces, 54(3), March 1976, pp. 513-
523.
5
Ulf Hedetoft. “National identity and Mentalities of War in Three EC Countries,” Journal of Peace Research, 30(3),
1993, pp. 281-300.
Convention