will spot the danger and fight to obstruct adverse policy change. In such cases, politicians and
interest groups must weigh policy investment against doing nothing while internalizing the long-
term costs of inaction. Such a distributive stalemate – under conditions in which the long-term
problem has achieved prominent agenda status – will greatly enhance the likelihood of policy
investment.
The balance of power among interest groups will depend greatly on the institutional
context in which they operate. Institutional contexts that highly centralize political power –
perhaps in the hands of a single-party cabinet commanding a disciplined parliamentary majority –
will tend systematically to generate asymmetries in power among organized interests. Those
groups that enjoy close alliances and tight organizational linkages with the political party in
power at a given moment will have direct access to top decision makers, while opposing groups
will be largely locked out of key venues of policy deliberation. In such an institutional context,
ascendant groups will face few obstacles to shifting their long-term problems onto other segments
of society, and will have little reason to support policy investments that are costly to them in the
short term.
In contrast, where policy making institutions disperse decision making power across
branches of government or decentralize it within legislatures, the playing field is likely to be
considerably more leveled. Such contexts are likely to offer a range of potential access points for
organized interests with competing distributive concerns. Unilateral attempts by any one group to
address long-term problems in ways that have clear adverse consequences for another are far less
likely to meet with legislative success. Of course, where veto power is widely dispersed and
competing interests cannot be reconciled, one frequent outcome will simply be policy inaction,
even where a long-term problem has achieved a prominent place on the policy agenda. Yet, for
problems that are widely perceived as compelling by organized groups and elected officials, if
policy action is to be taken, a decentralization of political power makes policy investment a more
likely outcome than delayed redistribution.
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Convention