Author's Keywords: Threat game, Rubinstein, EMU, exchange-rate policy	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61574_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Fahrholz, Christian. "Bargaining for Costs of Convergence in Exchange Rate Mechanism II: A Rubinstein Threat Game" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Oct 19, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61574_index.html>

Fahrholz, C. , 2004-10-19 "Bargaining for Costs of Convergence in Exchange Rate Mechanism II: A Rubinstein Threat Game" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61574_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: The Exchange-Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) is one of the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria, that Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have to comply with before they are admitted to the European Monetary Union (EMU). However, EMU-accession is not a `free lunch' but entails so-called costs of convergence. In accordance with the `Treaty establishing the European Community' CEECs have incurred these costs. Starting from the point of view that these new European Union (EU) members are in fact credibly committed to joining the EMU for political reasons---i.e. ensuring political stability in CEECs---it is demonstrated that CEECs are enabled to pass some costs of convergence on to current EMU-members. The CEECs' leverage is brought about through exchange-rate policy: CEECs will under identifiable conditions threaten to halt the entire enlargement process by putting their exchange-rate regimes and, as a result, political stability at risk. The according stance of exchange-rate policy is denoted as a 'threaten-thy-neighbour'-strategy. If a CEEC's brinkmanship constitutes a deterrent threat, both parties will negotiate the distribution of these costs of convergence. In line with this rationale, the entire process of transition, in reference to the phase of ERM II, can be modelled as a two-stage threat game, which is completed by a Rubinstein-bargaining solution (RBS).

The Political Costs of Exchange Rate Policy in the Post-Communist Countries

The EU Enlargement Policy and National Majority/Minority Dynamics in the Potential EU Members on the Example of Turkey