have to also bargain with domestic actors, both inside and outside of government. Putnam’s main
conclusion was that actors who have strong domestic constraints may have enhanced bargaining
leverage internationally. Because they have less room to make concessions at home, the argument
goes, leaders have more freedom to extract better bargains internationally.
However, what happens when both actors are so constrained? What happens if neither side
understands each other’s constraints? In these instances, the scope for compromise narrows
considerably and may even foreclose options that are both acceptable internationally and
domestically. Negotiations have a higher probability of failure if the parties do not understand these
domestic constraints. Relations between the U.S. and Europe suffer from these kinds of problems.
To understand how these influences are manifested, we first need to understand the nature of
policymaking in the U.S. and Europe.
In the United States, multiple actors typically hold veto power over policy.
emerges to achieve overwhelming bipartisan support, America’s sustained commitment to support
an issue is often undermined, particularly if the proposed policies antagonize powerful interests. The
political system in the US guarantees both houses of Congress important rights of co-determination.
Only Congress can declare war. Moreover, the Senate can block international treaties; furthermore,
both chambers—through the powerful committee chairs--can typically block policies they dislike.
The constitutional countervailing power of Congress is typically seen as an “invitation to struggle,” a
contest to define the national interest.
When the security threat is low, powerful committee chairs are able to exercise influence
over the American security agenda, even if at odds with the president. Despite his support for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, President Clinton was unable to muster the 2/3 majority in the
U.S. Senate. Similarly, Clinton struggled for years with the Congress to obtain funding for the
66
Theoretically, the political science literature has dubbed this multiple veto players. Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis 2002.
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Convention