possible. The U.S. bears most of the costs of keeping the peace and has the requisite capabilities to
do so. Europe lacks those capabilities but shares in the aspiration of governing the world. The
United States, given its forward position in so many places in the world, is both a beacon of hope
and a target of envy.
Given its great responsibilities, the U.S. has unique challenges that its allies would do well to
recognize. Even the countries that opposed the war in Iraq have a stake in the success of the
operation. Iraq is simply too important and too close to Europe for war opponents to punish the
Iraqis for the diplomatic failures of the Bush Administration. The hardest part for both parties will
be selling concessions at home. Unfortunately, given the way the policy process has unfolded over
the past decade, potential material and ideological gaps have been transmitted into a bigger problem.
With policymakers reluctant to disappoint core political constituencies, they seldom exercise the
leadership necessary to challenge their own citizens to adjust their thinking and face critical
problems.
Kagan oversimplifies the issue by suggesting material and values differences between the
U.S. and Europe necessarily beget transatlantic conflict. In my view, certain structural qualities of
the U.S. and European political systems hinder cooperation and thereby reinforce differences in
both material conditions and values. The challenge before us is as much internal as external, as our
respective domestic publics need to be reminded of the values we share and the interests we have in
common. If the trans-Atlantic relationship is to survive an uncertain security and global economic
environment, the arrival of a united Europe, and the messiness of democratic politics, American and
European policymakers must forge common policies that they are prepared to defend before their
constituents. Should they accept this responsibility, we may enjoy another half-century of spirited
cooperation.
Bibliography
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Convention