which differences in decision-making processes, voting rules and other institutions shape which
interests and values exercise influence in political life. These internal decision-making processes
typically establish constraints on Europeans and American decision-makers in international fora
which may exacerbate differences.
Even as we recognize the deep or structural reasons for problems between the U.S. and
Europe, we should be mindful of the potential for the concatenation of recent events and
personalities to lead to lasting damage to the transatlantic relationship. Three contingent events--
September 11
th
, sustained and unrestrained unilateralism by the George W. Bush administration,
coupled with proto-balancing behavior in Europe to pander to domestic electorates—may yet lead
the relationship beyond the pale, beyond the point of no return past which irreparable harm will
have been done.
It would be easy enough (and wrong) to suggest that the so-called “transatlantic divide” is a
product of George W. Bush’s unilateral policies. While his presidency accelerated a trend, he did
not initiate it. Bill Clinton’s presidency, on issues like landmines, the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and Kyoto, was similarly out of sync with its European allies. Clinton differed from his
successor in the way he convinced the Europeans to still like him even as he told them “NO.”
Indeed, Clinton and Bush may matter less in substance than in form. Perhaps the difference--on
substance--between George W. Bush and Bill Clinton is actually quite vast. Left to his own devices,
Clinton may well have ratified Kyoto and the ICC and banned landmines. In a sense, that is
precisely the point. The American system for most issues does not allow the President to his own
devices. The system of checks and balances is such that decisions are not made by one but by the
many.
a similar piece dedicated to transatlantic relations and climate policy. Busby and Ochs Forthcoming 2004. For an
earlier version of that argument, see Busby 2003 33-35.
4