1
To many observers, the argument that economic interests influence foreign policy
choices conjures the distressing (and probably unrealistic) image of cynical politicians
ignoring the national interest and selling themselves to wealthy campaign contributors.
This image contrasts with more legitimate forms of representation, in which political
leaders respond to the views of their constituents. To borrow a phrase from the 2000
election, the former image privileges the role of "the powerful," while the latter
emphasizes that of "the people." The trouble with this way of looking at the influence of
economic interests is that it is not only "the powerful" who have them. In foreign policy,
"the people" also have a stake in the openness of the international system for American
trade and investment, which can greatly affect their local communities for better or
worse. If these interests influence their opinions on foreign policy issues, then political
leaders who represent their views may simultaneously be responding to economic
interests. If this is the case, then the dichotomy between "the people and the powerful" in
the representation of economic interests may well be false.
Do differences in the regional economic stakes in American foreign policy
influence public support for American international activism and its most expensive
component, military spending? This paper will present evidence that they have. I will
begin by considering how economic interests could influence public opinion on national
security issues. The next section examines the effect of regional and individual economic
interests on individual opinion using data drawn from the American National Election
Study (ANES). Because the ANES data produce a surprising anomaly concerning the
effects of trade orientation on attitudes toward military spending, the next section tests
Convention