4
mutually inclusive and unlikely to be treated as an “either-or” dichotomy. In Taiwanese
political practice, they were frequently cited without clear distinction by political
practitioners in the past, though, in legal and scholarly studies, each may have its own
definition and reference. Whatever definition is adopted, each has been engaged in
cultural and ethnic inferences in strategizing politics.
2
Political group identification can
be created by various characteristics, be it gender, race, religion, age, or others, and
identity politics can operate in various political contexts. Hence, this paper will
concentrate on the use of ethnicity and culture to examine Taiwan’s identity politics in
light of its push for the indigenization of a “Taiwanese identity,” which may contradict
the once dominant “Chinese” culture’s core values. A dose of ethnic affectations in
Taiwanese politics has constantly been injected to create an exponential result.
3
The
result is that advocates and political entrepreneurs, driven either by their respective
political visions or political gains, may outbid moderate politicians by mobilizing voters
and polarizing society into extreme policy stands. Even so, if more and more people
convert to the new belief, the idealization, embellishment, and amplification of proposed
values and beliefs will gain increasing internalization among the public.
This study primarily attempts to examine the social reconstruction process of
Taiwan’s identity since 2000. How did the Chen Shui-bian regime reframe the political
and social discourses by constantly presenting and engaging in a series of political issues,
such as the rewriting of history texts and the language policy? How can one explain the
nature of collective action, which ranges from casual events to systematic efforts with a
sustained level of support? After all, collective action cannot occur without a “we”
characterized by a strong sense of solidarity and consciousness. At the same time, any
Convention