2
A Europe That Can Say No? Collective Action Problems in EU Responses to the
George W Bush Administration
Michael Smith
1
ABSTRACT
This paper starts from the position that the ‘Transatlantic Crisis’ of the early 2000s
has also on the face of it been a crisis for EU collective action in external policy:
instead of a ‘Europe that can say no’ in the light of US challenges, there appears to
have been a failure to produce any consensus on policy. Most obviously, the chaos of
EU Member State responses to the approach and conduct of the Iraq war raised
questions about the continuing feasibility of EU collective action in such episodes,
throwing doubt for some on the future development of ‘European foreign policy’. But
this turbulent episode must be placed within the broader context of developments in
EU external collective action and EU-US relations, and can usefully be analysed
through concepts of collective action theory. The paper pursues such an analysis, first
by reviewing the implications of a ‘Europe that can say no’ to the US, next by briefly
summarising the narratives provided by other approaches, and then by setting out
relevant collective action concepts. It then argues that collective action possibilities
and processes in EU external policy lie on a spectrum delineated by a number of key
factors and that therefore analysis and evaluation should take account of the
unevenness and variation between sectors of policy. In this light, the ‘EU crisis’ of the
early 2000s becomes part of a much broader picture in which the EU has scored
notable successes as well as policy failures.
Introduction: A Crisis for European Foreign Policy?
In the context of the broader ‘transatlantic crisis’ of the early 2000s, it is apparent that
the EU has also faced a crisis in the conduct of its external policies. The peremptory
nature of the ‘American challenge’ under the administration of George W Bush, and
the clash between European and American perceptions of world order (Smith 2004;
see also Peterson and Pollack 2003) came to a head in the later part of 2002 and in
2003, with the crisis over the approach, the conduct and the aftermath of the war in
Iraq. For the EU and its Member States, whatever position one takes on the overall
desirability or implications of the conflict, the Iraq issue created turbulence, internal
contradictions and ultimately disarray. Not only the clash between ‘old’ and ‘new’
Europe, but also the cleavages between and within almost all Member States, led to an
episode that for some was seen as a threat to the continuing possibility of a ‘European
foreign policy’. More specifically, it can be seen as throwing doubt on the possibilities
of creating and maintaining internal solidarity in the EU on its ‘US policy’ (Hill 2004;
Lindstrom 2003). Instead of a ‘Europe that can say no’ in the face of US demands – or
even a Europe that can say yes and mean it – there has arisen the image of a Europe
that can say yes, no and maybe all at the same time and in as many as 26 different
Convention