19
options, and Stolojan 38.2 percent.
33
But Vadim Tudor’s past performance from Figure 2
suggests that he is not to be counted out just yet, particularly given his skills at debating and
public relations stunts. Moreover, PRM’s score as a party depends quite heavily on the direct,
visible engagement of its leading charismatic personality: Vadim Tudor was noticeably absent
from much of the PRM local election campaign, something that will almost certainly change this
autumn.
Who Votes for Vadim Tudor?
Popular stereotypes of supporters of the European far right conjure images of angry, less
educated lumpenproletariat, poverty-stricken rural workers, and the unemployed as the mass
base most likely to support ultranationalist demagogues. Scholarship, on the other hand,
suggests that in fact, the European far right – whether the German National Socialists and the
Romanian Iron Guard of the 1930s, or France’s National Front and Austria’s Freedom Party –
sometimes secures substantial sympathy and even direct support across a surprising number of
social categories, although some scholars note that cross-class (or cross-income, cross-age, cross-
education) coalitions can and do vary to some degree in the level of support of each component,
particularly where blue- and white-collar workers are concerned.
34
Not having direct access to the multivariate analysis conducted by polling organizations,
this paper has to rely on certain conclusions drawn by them with regard to voter attitudes and
demographics, and attempts to extend some of those observations where appropriate. From what
data we have in the case of PRM and Vadim Tudor, the answer that emerges supports the
classification of “somewhat unevenly distributed but nonetheless cross-spectrum” support in a
postcommunist context. From the 2000 elections onwards, Vadim Tudor and PRM have been
Convention