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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61786_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Lim, Sunghack. "Foreign Capital Entry in the Domestic Banking Market in Korea: Bitter Medicine or Poison" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61786_index.html>

Lim, S. , 2004-09-02 "Foreign Capital Entry in the Domestic Banking Market in Korea: Bitter Medicine or Poison" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61786_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This paper deals with foreign ownership of the domestic bank in Korea. This subject bas been significant since the scope of foreign participation was widened at break-neck speed. I will argue that the foreign participation in domestic banking markets in Korea was better explained by political economy rather than economic analysis. Economic reforms or policies entail distributive consequences. Economic reforms usually impose costs that are immediate, certain, and often concentrated on specific groups. But most other benefits of reforms, in contrast to the costs, are usually uncertain, delayed, and diffused. Losers have great incentives to take political action to interrupt economic reforms, but gainers are uncertain about benefit and therefore not willing to take an action against losers (Nelson ,1994). Success of reform hinges on political condition as well as efficiency (Przeworski, 1991: 136, 162; Gourevitch, 1986: 19). Therefore, foreign entry in domestic banking industry is a game among major stakeholders such as the government, domestic banks, domestic capitals, labor and foreign investors. Answers to three questions will be searched in this paper. The first question is how sudden increase of foreign capital entry was possible despite of the developmentalist legacy and resistance of domestic banking industries. The second question is what the effects of foreign entry are and what we shall do to mitigate its harmful effect. The final one is how major stakeholders played, who won and lost and why.

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