9
mental principle of morality as the preservation of mankind, a principle from which
Locke deduces rights, but from which certain duties also flow, duties at least to respect
the rights of others. In the Second Treatise, these duties are interpreted very minimally, as
a principle of no harm (§6); but is this the whole of natural law according to Locke?
There are some ambiguities within the Two Treatises itself. The treatment of property in
the Second Treatise is silent on any duty of charity, for example, whereas the First
Treatise had discussed such a duty (§42). Moreover, duties to children are found in both,
though these are somewhat difficult to account for by the minimalist morality of the
Treatises (First Treatise §88; Second Treatise ch. 6).
It may be that natural law as we find it in the Two Treatises is only a part of
natural law as Locke understands it. Perhaps only a part of natural law need be invoked in
order to ground liberal politics; perhaps a near-exclusive emphasis on rights rather than
duties suffices for this purpose. As we shall shortly see, some of Locke’s other works
provide evidence that he believed natural law or morality in their true extent to be more
expansive. If this is true, morality as Locke understood it may be more demanding than it
appears in the Two Treatises (cf. Marshall 1994, 446, 453). And that in turn might require
supplementation of the theology of the Treatises.
IV
Like the Two Treatises of Government, Some Thoughts Concerning Education
takes “the preservation of all mankind” to be the fundamental rule and purpose of
morality (§116). But it gives that principle a more expansive interpretation. Concerning
property, for example, the first thing the pupil of Some Thoughts Concerning Education
learns is to share it cheerfully, that is, not to become too attached to it (§110). The reason
is that improper attachment to property is counter to morality. Locke goes so far in this
context as to assert that “Covetousness,” an excessive desire of property, is “the root of
all evil.” This comes as a surprise, to say the least, if one is familiar only with the Locke
of the Second Treatise, but makes sense if the Second Treatise contains a deliberately
truncated presentation of natural law. The Second Treatise centers on rights, limiting
duties to those absolutely required by a regime of rights—“perfect duties,” they were
called in the older tradition—since it is concerned primarily with the preconditions of
social peace and prosperity. Some Thoughts Concerning Education cultivates a more
Convention