Author's Keywords: asymmetric war war termination military intervention	Convention Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61855_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Sullivan, Patricia. "War Aims and War Outcomes: When Powerful States Lose Limited Wars" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61855_index.html>

Sullivan, P. , 2004-09-02 "War Aims and War Outcomes: When Powerful States Lose Limited Wars" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61855_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, major power states failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why do strong states frequently fail to achieve even limited objectives when they use military force against vastly weaker targets? Evidence from recent research suggests that war outcomes are largely a function of strategic selection (war initiation), military-industrial capabilities, combat effectiveness, and strategy choice. But none of these factors can explain why a major power would ever lose an armed conflict with a weak target. In sharp contrast to existing theories, I focus on the nature of the political objective being pursued to explain military intervention outcomes. I argue that relative military capabilities and relative tolerance for the costs of war affect the outcome of all wars, but that in asymmetric wars, the marginal effect of these two factors varies according to the nature of the political objective being pursued by the strong state. In particular, an actor’s destructive capacity relative to its opponent becomes less important, and each side’s tolerance for the costs of war become more important, as attainment of the actor’s political objectives becomes more dependent on target compliance. By acknowledging the critical role of war aims, this theory is able to 1) identify constraints on the military effectiveness of strong states and 2) specify the conditions under which military capabilities determine outcomes and those under which relative tolerance for costs moderates the effectiveness of force. The empirical implications of the theory are tested on an original data set of all major power military operations against both state and nonstate targets since World War II.

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