Draft – Please do not cite without permission
Douglas - 23
The leading advocates of the precision revolution have it exactly backwards. Precision
weaponry has done little to enhance the coercive strength of enemy decapitation or other
new strategies, which often fail because of inadequate intelligence. After a decade and a
half of trying – and failing – to solve this intelligence problem, it may be time to
recognize that it will not be overcome any time soon. Until it is, the combined use of air
power and ground forces – whose potency has been multiplied by precision weapons –
remains the most effective way for the United States to win major wars.
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Pape’s conclusion is not so much wrong – ground forces supported by air power have become
remarkably more effective in combination – but overweening. The United States faces a variety
of different potential opponents and may do so in a variety of contexts, from coercive diplomacy,
to coercive wars, to total ones. Rather than claim only one tool works, it is best to recognize that
most military tools have some effect, some better or more efficient than others for a given
context. Coercive wars are complex compared to the more straightforward total wars or even a
limited war over the permanent control of territory. The core mechanics of coercion are still
comparatively not well understood, but the proper reaction when confronted with the puzzle of
NATO victory in these cases is not to dismiss it or square it to the aggregate trend-line of the
past, but rather to treat it with curiosity and modesty in analysis, an injunction which applies to
the author and others interested in this critical item in the strategic studies sub-field as much as it
does to Robert Pape.
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Pape, “True Worth of Air Power,” 130.
Convention