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I have with me two gods, Persuasion and Compulsion. – Themistocles
Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, major power states have failed to attain
their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and
non-state targets since 1945. Why do strong states lose small wars?
The present state of our knowledge about the determinants of war outcomes presents a
puzzle. Recent research suggests that factors such as strategic selection (war initiation),
military-industrial capabilities (industrial production, troop strength, leadership, training,
technology, and ally contributions), and military strategy have the greatest effect on victory and
defeat in war (Arreguín-Toft 2001; Bennett and Stam 1998; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Gartner
and Siverson 1996; Millett, Murray and Watman 1988; Pape 1996; Reiter and Stam 1998; Reiter
and Stam 2002; Stam 1996). But none of these factors can explain why a powerful state would
ever lose an armed conflict it initiated against a materially weak target.
Major power states possess superior technology, more numerous and better trained
troops, better tactical capabilities, higher quality leadership, a wider range of options for
delivering firepower, and vastly greater resources and production capabilities than their weak
adversaries. Moreover, while some scholars have argued that strong states fail to achieve their
objectives when they choose the “wrong” military strategy (Arreguín-Toft 2001; Krepinevich
1986; Pape 1996; Stam 1996; Summers 1984), their theories cannot explain why or predict when
powerful states make poor strategy choices. Unlike their targets, major power states always
possess the technology, tactical capabilities, leadership, and troop quality necessary to
successfully execute even the most difficult and complicated military strategies.
In sharp contrast to existing theories, I focus on the nature of the political objective being
pursued to explain asymmetric war outcomes. I argue that relative military capabilities and
relative tolerance for the costs of war affect the outcome of all wars, but that the marginal effect
Convention