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relationship illuminates not only how committees might be effective, but the ways in which a
lack of trust leads to a low assessment of committee effectiveness, too.
First, it is important to conceive of economic agents, such as employees and
management, as sociable: they can achieve relationships of trust with others who are traditionally
categorized as adversaries in economic relationships. Second, the relationships of trust are often
found when social actors recognize the Humean condition of mutual vulnerability: the parties are
mutually dependent on one another to achieve their respective ends, and social actors recognize
collaboration as a desirable means to address mutual vulnerability when compared to other
alternatives (domination, avoidance of conflict, etc.) Upon recognition of collaboration, sociable
economic agents impart discretionary powers to others; in the case of safety and health
committees, management turns over some of its power to regulate working conditions to
employees. Finally, the conditions of trust, cooperation, and empowerment through discretion
are institutionalized: opportunities are opened up for participation, and participatory institutions
respond reflexively to new problems; as such, the gap between the conception and execution of
tasks breaks down. Effectiveness is found in this reflexivity, probing, and a climate of further
exploration when relationships of power threaten collaborative learning.
The two firms in this study illustrate different characterizations of effectiveness and
discretionary power through sociable economic agent theory. Employees at the lumber mill
emphasize management commitment as a reason for their interest and involvement on the safety
committee. Phrases such as “words backed up by actions” and “walk the talk” illustrate that in
the employees’ views, management takes observable actions to instill a sentiment of trust among
employee representatives. Management views on their commitment implicitly recognize a
condition of mutual vulnerability: while the workers certainly have their lives and health at stake,
management recognizes that injuries and illnesses cost the firm more than the time and resources
required to run an effective, decentralized safety program.
The mill also illustrates how the committee and subcommittees exercise discretionary
power. The training is extensive and highly decentralized. Many problems are addressed on the
shopfloor level through the subcommittee system. Management accepts many recommendations
written by the central safety committee.
This picture of cooperation and employee empowerment is complicated by some
conflicts between employees, the safety committee, management, and the union. Such conflicts
Convention