Author's Keywords: Regulation, enforcement, agent-based model, network	Convention Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61987_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Scholz, John. "Network Structure and Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61987_index.html>

Scholz, J. , 2003-08-27 "Network Structure and Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p61987_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Networks that coordinate local policy decisions can enhance the value of policy outcomes for the multiple users and agencies by overcoming adverse effects of policy fragmentation in federalist systems. Our previous study provides empirical evidence that effective local water policy networks increase both enforcement and compliance rates in the permit system authorized by the Clean Water Act. Our proposed APSA presentation intended to extend this study to consider the compliance of government permit holders, but data limitations and the problem of getting more accurate measures of networks precluded that study. In particular, we found that the theoretical foundations for analyzing the effectiveness of networks was too weak to allow us to readily develop the appropriate measures for networks. Consequently, this study probes the theoretical basis for the policy gains attributed to networks, focusing in particular on the potential gains from cooperation in the regulatory enforcement game and the role of network structure in supporting cooperation. We present simulation results that compare the impact of regular, random, and �small-world� networks of varying density on levels of cooperation in the regulatory enforcement game. Our full project explores the evolution of cooperation in the complex situation involving multiple regulatory agencies and multiple firms. We present here the first half of the exploration involving a single agency playing a �tit-for-tat� strategy against multiple firms. Since no strategy can do better than cooperate in this relatively simple case, we investigate the impact of alternative network structures on the level of cooperation achieved and the speed with which high levels of cooperation are achieved. The first third of the paper reviews the general perspective for analyzing the impact of local networks on federal regulatory enforcement. The second third reviews some promising concepts in network theory and discusses how we use agent-based simulations of the iterated prisoner�s dilemma-- specifically the iterated cooperative enforcement game�to explore the impact of network characteristics on the evolution of cooperative solutions. The final third presents the results of the simulations.

Local Governments as Network Broker in Collaborative Development Policy Networks.

Networks of Competition and Cooperation: The Structure of Economic Development Cooperation