4
Economic internationalization also affects relative scarcity of assets. According to the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, trade benefits individuals who own factors with which the national
economy is relatively well endowed and hurts individuals who own factors that are relatively
scarce (Mayda and Rodrik 2002; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001). Hence, in the wealthiest, most
capital-rich, member states we expect unskilled workers to be particularly Euroskeptic and
managers and professionals to be particularly Euro-supportive, while in the poorest, most
labor-rich, member states we expect the reverse.
1
Citizens may be sensitive to their collective economic circumstances, as well as to those
that affect them individually. That is to say, they may respond to economic conditions
sociotropically as well as egocentrically. We hypothesize that residents in countries that are net
recipients of European Union spending will be inclined to support European integration, while
those in donor countries will tend to oppose (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Brinegar, Jolly, and
Kitschelt forthcoming). The same logic is at work in federal or territorially divided states, where
poorer regions usually champion centralization to take advantage of redistributive policies, and
prosperous regions favor decentralization (or separatism) to minimize redistribution (Bolton
and Roland 1997; Horowitz 1981).
Subjective economic evaluations can be expected to influence public opinion on
European integration alongside objective factors (Rohrschneider 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton
1993: 510). European integration is perceived by most citizens to shape their economic welfare
in a general sense, and is therefore sensitive to atmospheric factors that shape electoral
preferences. Previous research has found that citizens who feel confident about the economic
future—personally and for their country—are likely to regard European integration in a
positive light, while those who are fearful tend to be Euroskeptical.
Convention