4
total) in 2001 (Harrison and Beck 2003, 11). Prior to Apprendi, drug offenders were sentenced
under procedures in which the sentencing judge, rather than the jury, determined drug quantity,
the single most important factor in determining a drug offender’s sentence under § 841.
The decision called into question the convictions and sentences of tens of thousands of
federal prisoners, spurring a deluge of appeals raising Apprendi challenges to sentences. In its
2001 annual report, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reported that the Apprendi
decision triggered a 77% increase in the number of motions for second or successive habeas
petitions among federal prisoners (United States 2001, 17). Along these same lines, Justice
O’Connor noted in a 2002 dissent that, as of May 31, 2002, the federal courts of appeals had
processed more than 1,800 criminal appeals involving Apprendi questions, and that
approximately 18% of all petitions for certiorari filed in the Supreme Court in the year ending on
that date raised “Apprendi-related claims” (Ring v. Arizona 2002, 620).
The second goal of this paper is to argue that the response of the courts of appeals to
Apprendi is generally explained by reference to the “institutional goals” of circuit judges,
primarily their concern with guaranteeing the functioning of the district courts. Faced with a
potential disruption in the context of sentencing—especially in drug crimes, a large proportion of
the courts’ docket—the judges of the U.S. courts of appeals acted to minimize the disruption.
The Apprendi decisions of the courts of appeals preserved the pre-Apprendi status quo to a
surprising extent, given the potentially vast changes in the process threatened by the decision.
This is not what one would expect if ideology were always the primary influence on judicial
decision-making under conditions of legal ambiguity. Especially in the criminal procedure area,
one would expect liberal judges to respond to legal ambiguity by fashioning pro-defendant rules
and conservative judges by fashioning pro-government rules. I find instead that both Democratic
Convention