(Page 9 of 27) - What Can the EU Learn from the American Federalism? authored by Bodnari, Florentina.

6. The EU lacks an essential element of democratic control: the EU’s executive is not yet
determined by the EU’s citizens, either directly, through the election of a president, or
indirectly (e.g. by the EP).

7. The EU has federal features, as far as the rule of law is concerned, but it is far weaker
regarding the representative government.

8. Finally, the EU is about supranational law and intergovernmental politics.

A federation is based on a certain degree of balanced homogeneity, when the federal units are a
proof of a common nationality and their citizens want the union, but not the unity, they remain
closer to their federal units. If there would be too much homogeneity, then the federation
would look more like a nation state and would loose its particularity of federalism. The lack of
homogeneity would lead to the end of the federation, as the case of the USSR was. Alexis de
Tocqueville predicted the end of Canada, when he argued, that on the long the English majority
would assimilate the French minority (Tocqueville, 1835-1840/1946). His prediction was not
realised, even if there are still problems within this “two-nations” federation. Therefore, only a
balanced homogeneity is the right degree. The political homogeneity, as the same political
form of government, plays as well an important role. Within the EU, each member state can
continue keeping its form of government as parliamentary government (Westminster model),
presidential government, or another mixed form of government. Therefore, the EU lacks
political homogeneity. The EU is also very heterogeneous economically. The heterogeneity of
the EU can be better seen, comparing it to the homogeneity of the USA. According to
Tocqueville, the US citizens formed a true people because they shared not only the same
religious and political ideas, but also the same philosophical and moral conceptions
(Tocqueville, 1835-1840/1946), this is not the case of the EU.

The EU needs a change in the political architecture applied to the elaboration of a design of
new institutions. If these institutions are not reinforced the enlargements will make the EU
more inefficient and less democratic. Maybe it was not at all necessary to enlarge the EC.
Maybe it would have been better if the deepening continued with the founding six countries.
However, if the enlargement process still was launched before and today again, the EU cannot
refuse any more to open its doors. There are usually three solutions to solve a crisis: nothing
is changed, it means the traditions are kept; or only a little bit is changed or lastly everything
is completely changed, which corresponds to a ”revolution.” The EU is now at the stage
where it should change a little, because if nothing is changed it cannot advance, if everything
is changed, there is a risk that the initial aim will be lost. Jacques Delors emphasised that the
EU is a ”non-identified object,” Gérard Duprat answered ”it is an identified object” (Duprat,
1996:1-13), a fact which can be seen in its relation between law, politics, and democracy.
Maybe the radical processes of institutional change represented by the EU can be usefully
compared to previous reordering of authority such as the break-up of the Carthaginian
Empire.

The Commission’s position during the negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty were in favour of
federalism: “keeping to the course charted by the Treaty of Rome, leading eventually to a
federal-type organisation”

. The federal idea received a lot of critique and could not be

Commission Opinion on the 21

of October 1990 on the Proposal for Amendment of the Treaty Establishing

the European Economic Community with a View to Political Union, Com. (900) 600 final, Brussels, October 23,
1990.