4
Quota laws that apply to subnational elections constitute a third variation. Eight
of the 10 countries that have subnational quota laws also have national laws, but Greece,
Namibia and South Africa have quota laws that apply only to municipal elections.
Finally, parliaments with reserved seats aside a certain percentage of seats for women
rather than candidate positions. India adopted a policy of reserving one-third of the seats
in its local governments for women, and 10 other countries have reserved seats at either
the national or local level.
3
[Insert Table 1 here]
The widespread adoption of these measures is puzzling because gender quotas
appear to violate one of the most widely held assumptions about legislative behavior in
political science—that elected officials seek to protect their positions. Even in countries
where legislators cannot be reelected, holding office is a highly sought after prize, often
critical to advancing one’s political career (Carey 1996). Why would predominantly
male politicians adopt measures that would ostensibly limit their own chances to be
nominated for political office, particularly in countries where traditional gender roles
predominate? As one Uruguayan legislator stated during a debate on gender quotas,
“We’re talking about giving up positions of power here, and nobody likes to give up
power.”
4
The growing literature on gender quotas tends to focus on either party or national
quotas, but does not explain the conditions under which a country will adopt one or the
other. I argue that three factors must be present in order for parties with voluntary quotas
to support the adoption of national-level quota laws. First is a contagion effect in which
parties or majority coalitions in congress attempt to neutralize the electoral advantages
Convention