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with which they are to comply."(221). Thus, "the disenfranchisement of ex-offenders violates
this basic tenet of modern liberalism." (Simson 2002; Harvey 1994 from Harvard Law Review
1989). The removal of felons' voting rights violates the Lockean principle that each
transgression from the social contract should be "'punished to that degree, and with severity, as
will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others
from doing the like.'" (Harvey 1994 from Harvard Law Review 1989). Accordingly,
"disenfranchisement for life fails to meet this standard permanent exclusion from the political
community is imposed equally on all felons," regardless of the degree of severity of their crimes
(Reback 1973: 860).
Similarly, social policy activists have condemned the punishment justification for ex-
felon disenfranchisement. As authorities Howard Itzkowitz and Lauren Oldak (1973) point out,
ex-felon disenfranchisement cannot satisfy even "one of the four traditionally accepted rationales
for punishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution and incapacitation." (730-731) (Simson
2002; Harvey 1994). In terms of rehabilitation, the removal of voting rights negatively impacts
any attempt by ex-offenders to enhance self-esteem, which is essential to the reformative
process, by implying that they are unfit to cast their ballots (Simson 2002; Harvey 1994 from
Itzkowitz and Oldak 1973). Disenfranchisement serves to further alienate and isolate ex-
offenders from society by denying them "participation in the most crucial function of a
democratic society" and is thus counterproductive to rehabilitation's aim of "strengthening the
criminal's community ties by reinforcing his identification with community values and the habits
of law-abiding citizens." (Simson 2002; Harvey 1994 from Itzkowitz and Oldak 1973: 732).
Moreover, rehabilitation's goal of fostering community acceptance of the ex-offender is
Convention