26
opposing the election of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the leader of PDI-P, which had won a plurality
of 33.76% seats in the election. Poros Tengah succeeded in electing Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus
Dur) to the presidency.
104
See Damanik 2002, 282-286.
105
Damanik, 2002, 291.
106
Although PK supports government according to syariah, it opposes syariah imposed by a
government (Damanik 2002, 250-51).
107
Interview, July 10, 2003.
108
A faction in the armed forces and some New Order elites (Wiranto and Fuad Bawazir are
among those frequently named) are said to have conspired to keep the conflict going in order to
destabilize the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid so that Suharto and other New Order figures
would not be prosecuted for corruption. See Robert Hefner, “Global Violence and Indonesian
Muslim Politics” American Anthropologist 104 (3): 762, September 2002
109
The campaign against Gus Dur was initiated by KAMMI chairman Andi Rahmat in November
2000 when the KAMMI National Congress recommended that the MPR hold a special session to
ask for President Abdurrahman Wahid’s accountability (“KAMMI wants Gus Dur to be
Impeached,” Jakarta Post, November 11, 2000).
110
Eggy Sudjana of KISDI denied funding demonstrations against Gus Dur but said that he
advises students on strategy and provides snacks and drinking water for demonstrators.” Fuad
Bawazier, who was a Finance Minister under Suharto, defended himself against accusations of
funding demonstrations by saying that because he heads the alumni wing of HMI, he is frequently
asked to support student activities. “If you don’t contribute, the students call you stingy.” (Dini
Djalal, “Indonesi’s Powerful Student Movement Divided” Far Eastern Economic Review, March
22, 2001).
111
See Damanik 2002, 303. PK was offered a ministerial position in Megawati’s cabinet, and
again they chose to decline the position on the grounds that they wished to stay outside the
government where they could act as a critical opposition. The PK position on participation in
government needs to be understood within the context of Indonesian politics, where political
leaders frequently use government positions to raise funds (generally through corruption) for their
party.
112
In this campaign PK has been drawn to work with its old ally in the Reformasi movement, the
secular radical Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD). According to Akbar Zulkaffar of KAMMI, the
two parties explored the idea of a united front in opposition to “elite politics” at a meeting in
Jakarta on July 11, 2002, where PRD launched a new newspaper, Pembebasan (Liberation).
113
In July KAMMI rallies were calling Megawati the “Killer of Reform” (Sri Wahyuni and
Kurniawan Hari, “Megawati, legislators at odds over commission” Jakarta Post, July 11, 2002).
114
“The PMII student network had intended joining forces with KAMMI, HMI and BEM but
they did not give us enough space to maneuver. They monopolized the central theme,” a student
source told Laksamana.Net (“Student Movement Discredited” Laksamana.Net, March 20, 2002).
115
“Indonesia’s Ba’asyir Tells Hospital Visitors Ties With USA Are Against Religion” (BBC,
October 31, 2002). Roqib, from East Java, is a graduate of Al Azhar in Cairo.
116
For instance, Jim Schiller observes that in Jepara “the very tiny PK is led by doctors, its men
and women sit separately at rallies which cater more to deepening loyalty than attracting new
voters.” Comment to Indonesianist email list managed by Ed Aspinall (February 18, 2003).
117
“Power Means Serving Others.” Interview with Van Zorge, Heffernan & Associates (March
2002). See Sekilas Partai Keadilan [A Glance at Party Keadilan] in Damanik (2002, 215-263).
118
The cadre system of PK is based on cells of ten members who meet for Qur’an reading and
discussion. After “socialization,” activists are urged to form new cells. This results in a structure
with seven levels of hierarchy.
119
Interview with Nur Wahid Hidayat, July 10, 2003.
Convention