Moreover, we hypothesize that the enfranchisement of a significant number of potential
Democratic voters will be more likely when popular support for Democrats statewide is weak.
Therefore, we hypothesize that felon disfranchisement laws are more likely to be repealed when
the vote shares of Democratic presidential candidates are low. The rationale for this hypothesis
is as follows. If a state is overwhelmingly Democratic already, Democratic legislators do not
have an incentive to change a relatively popular law (felon disfranchisement). However, when
their party hold on power is marginal, Democrats should have a more urgent incentive to
enfranchise a population that is likely to favor their party in future elections. Conversely,
Republican legislators will be very reluctant to enfranchise potential democratic voters when the
partisan balance in the state is already tilted against their party (i.e., a majority of voters are
Democrats). Only when their hold on power is strong enough should we expect them to consider
expanding the right to vote to felons and ex-felons. Thus, both Democratic and Republican
legislators should be more likely to repeal felon disfranchisement provisions when statewide
support for Democrats is relatively weak.
Finally, we also test the competing hypothesis offered by others that constituency-based
effects (and not party) are the primary cause of felon disfranchisement reforms in the U.S. states.
This hypothesis would imply that the ideology of a state’s electorate impacts the liberalization of
felon disfranchisement provisions. Thus, the more liberal a state’s electorate is, the more likely
there will be a change giving greater voting rights to felons or ex-felons.
Dependent Variable: Relaxing Felon Disfranchisement Provisions
There are several categories of persons that may be disfranchised due to a criminal
conviction. At one end of the spectrum, states may allow all felons to vote, even those who are
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Convention