in the countries. Table 1 shows the average centralization scores of the countries that fit
into each cell. At first glance, it is clear that, as expected, non-corporatist liberal markets
have less centralized labour movements than corporatist coordinated markets. On second
glance, however, it appears that the distinction between federal and non-federal systems
does not hold. The average centralization score for Australia, Canada and the United
States (federal countries) is 0.20, which is higher than the score of 0.17 for New Zealand
and the United Kingdom, the unitary liberal markets. Investigating this further, it is
important to note that while the averages for Canada and the United States are both
0.071, the average centralization score for Australia is 0.47. What accounts for the strong
centralized union movement in Australia?
Understanding this outcome requires some knowledge of the particulars of the
labour movement and social policy in Australia. A federal arbitration court has
traditionally set wage levels in Australia, which only heard petitions from organizations.
Schwartz (2000) comments that because the court decisions bound workers and
employers in the entire industry, even if they did not apply to the court themselves,
labour was compelled to organize to have a role. I believe that the existence of this court
counteracted the effects of federalism because a situation was created in which labour
interests needed to organize at the federal level to influence social policy. In turn, ACTU
became a powerful political actor. If the average centralization score of Australia is
excluded from the calculations for the federal, liberal market countries, the outcome is in
line with expectations – 0.071, which is much lower than the average centralization of the
unitary countries or coordinated market countries.
15
The fortunes and popularity of socialist parties, in particular, are prone to change over time with changes
in citizen preferences.
Convention