This paper is particularly interested in understanding how institutions have
impacted the labour movement in countries where corporatist
1
decision-making is not
common – namely, a group of countries called “liberal market economies.”
2
This group
of countries is of particular interest because the labour movement does not have a
guaranteed seat at the policy-making table. In these countries, however, labour can still
have a role in policy-making, even though the size and strength of unions in the liberal
market countries varies significantly from that of corporatist countries.
The remainder of this paper proceeds in several parts. First, I outline the literature
and theory regarding the impact of institutions within societies, to gain an understanding
of how organized labour should, theoretically, be impacted. I use these findings to
theorize about the role of two particular institutions – federalism and party discipline.
Second, I discuss the organization and development of the labour movement, using the
premise that institutional context will have an influence. Following this, I develop three
hypotheses regarding labour movement patterns that I expect to see among countries with
different institutional configurations. Finally, I discuss some preliminary evidence and
possible sources to be investigated in the future that may help to determine the
applicability of my theorizing. As I stated earlier, this paper represents my initial foray
into this topic, but I hope to expand upon it in the future.
1
Kenworthy (2000:1-2) provides this definition of corporatism: “In my view corporatism consists of
various types of institutional arrangements whereby important political-economic decisions are reached via
negotiation between or in consultation with peak-level representatives of employees and employers (and/or
other interest group and the state).”
2
See Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2002.
Convention