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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p62346_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Holyoke, Thomas. "Madam Chair, We Respectfully Disagree: Interest Group Competition and Congressional Testimony" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p62346_index.html>

Holyoke, T. , 2003-08-27 "Madam Chair, We Respectfully Disagree: Interest Group Competition and Congressional Testimony" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p62346_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Because lobbyists for interest groups need to be responsive to the needs and desires of lawmakers, themselves shaped by the structure of institutions, lawmakers can use the power of their institutions to suppress conflict among groups. This paper examines how ideological outlier committees differ in their interaction with interest groups in congressional hearings from non-outliers. Unlike non-outliers, outlier committees desire to invite interest groups that will provide unanimous support for the committee agenda thereby suppressing conflict. But pressures from group members and competitor interest groups can force lobbyists to defy the outlier committee when such pressures are extreme. I test this argument with data on interest group testimony before twenty committees on six issues from 1999 to 2001. The results demonstrate the importance and limits of institutional structure and lawmakers preferences of the strategic decisions of interest group lobbyists.

Interest Group Ideology and Lobbying Partner Selection: Models and Evidence from Amicus Curiae Briefs

Strange Bedfellows or the Usual Suspects? Spatial Models of Ideology and Interest Group Coalitions.

State Legislator Ideology and State Interest Group Scores

Personal and Professional Relationships between Lobbyists and Legislators Interest System Differences in the States