2
In the late 1970s, members of Congress began creating leadership PACs: Political
action committees that raise and distribute campaign funds on behalf of their politician-
sponsors to other candidates. Over the next twenty-five years, the number of leadership
PACs and the amount of money they contribute grew considerably. In the 1999-2000
election cycle, 160 national leadership PACs allocated over $16 million in campaign
contributions to candidates for the U.S. Congress (Center for Responsive Politics 2003).
Leadership PACs created by members of Congress are interesting for reasons that
go well beyond their impact on campaign finances. Questions about how incumbent
legislators make decisions and the goals they pursue have generated many examples of
distinguished scholarship (e.g., Fenno 1973; Kingdon 1989). The standard list of possible
goals includes reelection, influence within the legislature, and good public policy (Fenno
1973, p. 1).
1
Among these, maximizing the probability of reelection is often seen as the
primary goal, sometimes to the virtual exclusion of all others (Fiorina 1989; Mayhew
1974). When it comes to operating a leadership PAC, however, maximizing the sponsor’s
chances for reelection is clearly not the primary goal. Studying leadership PAC
contributions therefore gives us an opportunity to study the goals that incumbent
legislators pursue when their own reelection is not at issue.
1
Another possible goal mentioned by Fenno in his study of the U.S. House of
Representatives is laying the groundwork for a career beyond the House (1973, p.2).
Some leadership PAC sponsors no doubt are hoping to build support for a future run for
higher office, but our data do not allow us to distinguish between this goal and seeking to
become more influential in the House.
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