4
Specifically, I argue that whether a committee is an ideological outlier from the
parent chamber influences who is invited to testify. Though competing interest groups,
all things being equal, would let their differences show in testimony, the desire to testify
can suppress conflict as lobbyists change their positions to fit committee agendas. But
their capacity to shift positions is constrained by the desires of group members and
competitive pressures from other groups. I test this argument with data on congressional
hearings on six issues during the 106
th
and 107
th
Congresses. The results demonstrate the
differences in committee type as well as the strength and limits of their influence on
interest group behavior.
Interest Group Competition Alone and in Institutional Context
Competition among organized interests occur when lobbyists representing
different positions on the same issue attempt to influence the shape of policies designed
to address that issue to the benefit of those they represent. As the size and diversity of
the national interest group community increases, competition among interests becomes
increasingly common on most issues (Walker 1991; Berry 1999; Baumgartner and Leech
2001). But because gains to one group do not necessarily translate into zero-sum losses
to others, competition need not result in open conflict among interest groups; negotiation
and cooperation resulting in coalition building is also possible. The likelihood of
cooperation occurring depends not only on the ideological distance between the positions
groups set to please members, but also how closely tied the lobbyist, acting as the
members’ agent, is to that position. The greater the distance and/or the stronger group
members feel for their position on the issue, the more any alternative position will be
Convention