8
previous findings suggested that the subtler the forms of influencing voters were, the
more reliable they were in delivering the intended results. For instance, we found that
even in 1998, public television exposure during the campaign, despite the likely intention
of news editors, failed to make people more likely to believe that the economy was in a
good shape. However, both in 1994 and 1998 public television primed citizens’ vote
choices on issue concerns and economic evaluations very much the way as government
party campaigners presumably desired. Thus, it would seem that relatively subtle forms
of media influence – like priming – could work in intended ways even when the media in
question is widely perceived as biased. At the same time, even a relatively credible
source – like public television in 1998 – may fail to have a straight persuasive impact on
relatively strongly held citizen opinions.
Thirdly, it is also conceivable that the presence or absence of alternative television
channels was the key reason for pro-governmental television broadcast having a
boomerang effect in 1994, but helping the government in 1998. Since there was no
noteworthy televised alternative to the political coverage of public television in 1994,
dissatisfied viewers could not simply switch to news programs on other channels. As a
result, people with an interest in watching politics on television kept following public
television broadcast even if they found it biased and objectionable. It is plausible that
their continued exposure to a disliked source kept their dissatisfaction with government-
controlled media very much on their mind while thinking of the parties and casting their
vote. The situation was quite the opposite in 1998, and probably that is why the net
impact of public television broadcast was favorable for the main government party.
A fourth possible explanation is offered by an argument that is frequently heard in
some circles in post-communist countries, namely that most top journalists, and
especially in the electronic media, are entrenched holdovers from the media personnel of
the ancien régime, and therefore sympathizers of the ex-communist parties. Thus, their
influence on message content on public television may always work in favor of the
former communist parties, whether they are in government or opposition. Given our –
admittedly impressionistic – knowledge of the partisanship of those in control of political
coverage on Hungarian public television and the scale of repeated changes in personnel,
we do not find this explanation particularly plausible. Yet, it is certainly consistent with
Convention