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This paper seeks to test the notion that telephone-based voter mobilization drives
increase voter turnout. Further, it explores the question of whether partisan cues are
relevant to the efficacy of a mobilization effort. It uses an experimental design embedded
within both a non-partisan phone drive and a partisan phone drive to investigate this
question. The experimental design is useful because it provides a means for directly
observing the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable while holding
all other possible variables constant via random assignment to treatment and control
groups. Studying the impact of a mobilization drive on turnout within different partisan
contexts improves the external validity of the findings, because it reflects the different
varieties and natures of get-out-the-vote drives, so as to better reflect diverse political
realities.
The true effect of voter turnout on partisan outcomes has been a paradox for
political scientists for generations. While infrequent voters are more likely to vote
Democratic than frequent voters, we cannot expect that U.S. elections that have higher
turnout are ones (in general) in which we can expect the Democrats to have done better
(DeNardo 1980, Tucker and Vedlitz 1986; DeNardo 1986, Nagel and McNulty 1996,
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The author is grateful to the Cal-Berkeley Democrats for their cooperation and support in performing their
mobilization drive and embedding a field experiment within it; I especially would like to single out Tom
DiSimone, Amanda Matteis, Annette Eaton, Eric Anthony, Ben Spangenberg, Adam Borelli, and Sarah
Syed for special thanks. I also want to thank the Cal Berkeley Youth Vote coalition for their help, with
special thanks to Anu Joshi, Lauren Baumann, and Mo Kashmiri. I am also grateful to Le Shaun Yopack
and the Alameda County Registrar of Voters. Additionally, I wish to thank Donald Green and David
Nickerson of the Institute for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University for their critical and collegial
assistance, and Robert Thorman of the National Youth Vote Coalition for his heroic cooperation and
support.
This paper is part of a dissertation; I am grateful to my committee for their help and guidance: Henry
Brady, Bruce Cain, Susan Rasky, Merrill Shanks, and Raymond Wolfinger. I would also like to thank the
Cal-Berkeley Graduate Workshop in American Politics for their advice and support: Justin Buchler, Casey
Dominguez, Matthew Jarvis, Keith Smith, and Amy Steigerwalt. I want to further thank Nancy Ko,
Melissa Fonseca, Janeen Jackson, Liz Weiner, and the Institute of Governmental Studies at UC Berkeley
for invaluable research assistance. Any errors or deficiencies in this paper are solely the responsibility of
the author.