18
peril’ in this time of uncertainty. Moving swiftly, Napoleon constructed an extensive
censorship and surveillance apparatus capable of spreading his message while disrupting,
if not eliminating, the voices of rivals not sold on his vision.
72
This curious amalgam of radical and conservative principles would not go
unchallenged, however, for the regime’s articulation of a focal point enable other groups
to mobilize against it. In particular, the Democ-Soc movement would emerge to contest
Napoleon’s vision. This movement articulated a religious and socialist vision that cited the
radical 1793 Revolution as a more appropriate model for the new France. The rapid
growth of this movement, even in the face of heavy censorship and outright repression,
allowed Napoleon to capitalize on heightened fears of social unrest. On 2 December 1851,
he seized control of the state in a coup d’état. In response, the Democ-Soc staged a
massive protest across France – some 100,000 participated – that was ultimately crushed
by police agencies.
73
The temporary suppression of resistance to the regime’s project
meant that the Second Empire could be ratified by plebiscite (2 December 1852) that
further burnished the regime’s image.
Struggle with the Democ-Soc movement would, however, leave an important
legacy. The suppression of this movement would shrink the realm of ‘acceptable’
opposition, thereby serving to ‘spotlight’ the regime’s rhetoric and reducing its ability to
recast its project. The regime was also forced to rely on starker language – particularly
fear of social unrest – that even it perhaps intended. A constant need to engage and refute
the Democ-Soc movement’s rival project also served to clarify the regime’s own stance by
forcing it to rely on the repetition of a narrow band of simple themes to win public
opinion. In effect, the regime had succeeded in creating a focal point, one that held the
promise of fostering citizen allegiance but also possessed the danger of facilitating the rise
of new opposition groupings.
Yet can we argue that the regime possessed a coherent and consistent project
even at this early stage of the transition? Arguably, Napoleon and his advisors were clearly
adhering to a certain vision of Napoleonic France that, while adjusted instrumentally in
the face of challenges, formed their basis of action..
74
Indeed, there is a remarkable
consistency of ideas between Napoleon’s own pre-power writings, his publications and
speeches during 1848-52, and the symbols employed at the numerous public celebrations.
Napoleon certainly believed that he possessed a coherent vision: “An entire system
triumphed on 10 December,” he argued in 1849, “for the name of Napoleon is in itself a
programme. At home in means order, authority, religion, the welfare of the people;
abroad, national dignity.”
75
More specifically, the Bonapartist project had two principal reference points,
namely, the values of the Napoleonic past and the norms of the European Concert. The
regime would draw actively on these reference points to provide various components or
‘strands’ of its identity bundle.
Napoleon’s view of the ‘new’ France, for example, borrowed consciously from the
ideals of the 1789 revolution and, in particular, from the figure of Napoleon I as a means
of anchoring his regime in a glorious past. Rejecting the socialist overtones and upheaval
of the 1793 revolution, he cast the regime as a bulwark against social disorder even as he
championed the merits of universal manhood suffrage. Indeed, a simple content analysis
of twelve proclamations (1849-52) records no fewer than 114 references to ‘the people’ or
72
Cragin 2001; Plessis 1985; Atkins 1984; Agulhon 1983; Forstenzer 1981; Payne 1958; Case 1955
73
Some 26,884 protesters were arrested, sounding the death-knell of the movement. Berenson 1984;
Margadant 1979; Merriman 1978.
74
Hazareesingh 1998: 29-35 for excellent summary of the historiographical debate surrounding the
meaning of Second Empire Bonapartism. See Rothney 1969; Plessis 1985: 8-11; Campbell 1978: 2-8
75
Louis-Napoleon, Speech to National Assembly, 1849. Quoted in Jerrold 1888: 109-110.