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Gaul, Natural Frontiers, or the Hexagon: Where and What is France?
Unformatted Document Text:  2 likely to involve military force and escalate to war than are disputes over other issues.” (Diehl 1999: ix-x) The systematic study of conflicts over territory is of relatively recent origin, and to date no explanation has emerged for why conflicts over territory are more likely to escalate to war. Some might argue that an understanding of what and where the Homeland is will do little to add to our understanding of territorial conflicts since claims to territory and conflict over territory depend solely on the balance of forces and the configuration of the international system. This argument is fundamentally flawed because the likelihood of conflict and the outcome of any fight depend not just on the strength of the combatants but also their resolve. 2 (Schelling 1966; Friedman 1977: 59) In other words, it is not just a state’s (or group’s) military resources, but also its willingness to spend those resources for a given goal that determines the outcome of a conflict. The record shows that people are wiling to make significant sacrifices not just for territory with instrumental value, but also for territory of only symbolic value. (Diehl 1999; Huth 1996) Two examples suffice to make the point. In July 2002, Spain and Morocco both used their military to reinforce their respective claims to a small rock in the sea barely deserving to be called an island about 200 meters from the coast of Morocco. At the same time, Bolivia finally decided to forego the development and exploitation of oil and gas reserves which would add about $ 1 billion to an economy of about $ 8 billion because a pipeline to the Pacific Coast would have to be built through 2 If just the relative balance of power determined the size and shape of states and the location of their boundaries, the question arises why a stronger state would refrain from taking all the territory of the weaker state. In other words, I am suggesting here that if one group is willing to fight significantly harder for one piece of territory than its opponent (because it is Homeland for one but not the other), this may help overcome the commitment problem that will lurk at the end of any war.

Authors: Goemans, Hein.
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2
likely to involve military force and escalate to war than are disputes over other issues.”
(Diehl 1999: ix-x) The systematic study of conflicts over territory is of relatively recent
origin, and to date no explanation has emerged for why conflicts over territory are more
likely to escalate to war.
Some might argue that an understanding of what and where the Homeland is will
do little to add to our understanding of territorial conflicts since claims to territory and
conflict over territory depend solely on the balance of forces and the configuration of the
international system. This argument is fundamentally flawed because the likelihood of
conflict and the outcome of any fight depend not just on the strength of the combatants
but also their resolve.
2
(Schelling 1966; Friedman 1977: 59) In other words, it is not just a
state’s (or group’s) military resources, but also its willingness to spend those resources
for a given goal that determines the outcome of a conflict.
The record shows that people are wiling to make significant sacrifices not just for
territory with instrumental value, but also for territory of only symbolic value. (Diehl
1999; Huth 1996) Two examples suffice to make the point. In July 2002, Spain and
Morocco both used their military to reinforce their respective claims to a small rock in
the sea barely deserving to be called an island about 200 meters from the coast of
Morocco. At the same time, Bolivia finally decided to forego the development and
exploitation of oil and gas reserves which would add about $ 1 billion to an economy of
about $ 8 billion because a pipeline to the Pacific Coast would have to be built through
2
If just the relative balance of power determined the size and shape of states and the location of their
boundaries, the question arises why a stronger state would refrain from taking all the territory of the weaker
state. In other words, I am suggesting here that if one group is willing to fight significantly harder for one
piece of territory than its opponent (because it is Homeland for one but not the other), this may help
overcome the commitment problem that will lurk at the end of any war.


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