(Page 19 of 25) - Decentralization, Civil Society and Ethnonationalism: Arabs in Israel authored by Haklai, Oded.

institutions separate from the state, that would replace state institutions in providing
services, primarily education, religious and cultural services, as well as in their policing
and judicial functions. Hence, the objective of the Islamic movement should be seen as to
create an Islamic state within the Jewish state. In doing so, the Islamic movement advocates
building linkages where possible with other Islamic movements, primarily in the West
Bank and Gaza, but also in other Arab countries. The goal is to create a kind of a
confederation of Islamic polities that transcends the state.

Guided by these principles, the Islamic Movement minimizes its interaction with

external state authorities. The movement established a network of community services,
such as kindergartens, elementary schools, seminaries, libraries, summer camps, sports
clubs that compete in a separate Islamic leagues, medical centers, a drug rehabilitation
center, and other charity-based services. It is also active in collecting donations, from
Muslims in Israel, Middle Eastern governments and Muslim associations in Western
Europe and North America. These donations are used for creating a welfare system and
supporting its enterprises as well as for improving local infrastructure, such as local roads
and bus stops. The Islamic movement has been able to identify areas where the state has
been negligent in providing services, primarily infrastructure and welfare services, and to
pick up the slack. In 1986, when its support started to rise, the movement also began to
circulate a newspaper. Generally, the movement rejected violent confrontation with the
state, although it encouraged Arabs to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinian uprising
in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1980s through strikes and demonstrations.

A rift in the Islamic movement erupted in the early 1990s between the leader,

Sheikh Darwish, and an internal opposition led by Sheikh Salah. The rift was engendered
by a disagreement on whether to participate in parliamentary elections, a position
supported by Darwish and his followers. Opponents of this view argued that participating
in national elections would strengthen and legitimize the institutions from which the
movement wished to disassociate and that, therefore, national elections should continue to
be boycotted. Indeed, in the 1980s, the movement urged its supporters not to vote at all. In
local-level elections, however, the movement did participate, and by the late 1980s, it made
some significant gains, winning the chairmanship in six localities, including in the
important town of Umm al-Fahm. The movement justified its participation in local
elections by reasoning that while it disputed the state, at the local level of government, it
was more able to serve the Arab community. Since, the authority of municipalities and
local councils is delegated from the state, and since they interact with it for budgets and
deliverance of services, this argument does not seem to stand up to the principle of “boycott
so as not to legitimize”. It appears that at the local level, the Islamic movement felt it could
carve a partially autonomous domain, make an impact and increase its support base
whereas at the national level, it was always going to stay marginal. Hence, for instrumental
reasons, it was willing to make compromises and interact with the state at the local level.

The dispute erupted in the mid-1990s, when, following the launch of the Israeli-

Palestinian peace process, Sheikh Darwish decided to switch to a less isolationist approach
and participate in the 1996 national elections. He reasoned that the reconciliation of Israel
and the Palestinian national movement brought about mutual recognition of national rights
and there was no purpose in opposing Israel’s right to exist. Darwish’s approach was
conciliatory. He maintained that the Muslim minority should be allowed some practical
autonomy, an arrangement Rouhana terms “personal autonomy” (1997, 212), but can more
accurately be referred to as “institutionalized cultural autonomy”, whereby the Arabs have
constitutionally guaranteed rights to administer their own cultural affairs, education
system and media. In exchange for such an arrangement, the Arab minority should respect
the state’s laws. Moreover, Darwish felt that the peace process should be utilized by the
Muslim Arabs within Israel to make social gains, combining parliamentary activity if need