19
proves its indigeneity to be on par with “Dayak.” In the heighten ethnic politicizations of
the post-Suharto state, this is what mattered and was deemed the appropriate action to take.
The Communication Forum of Malay Youth (FKPM), a youth-oriented, security
militia that formed weeks prior to the escalation of hostilities, was instrumental in the anti-
Madurese mobilizations. With implicit backing from the Sambas district-executive,
military and police commanders, FKPM used a small fight between a bus conductor and a
passenger to inflict greater violence against local Madurese. After two weeks of sporadic
clashes, a mysterious murder of a Dayak precipitated broad Dayak engagement against
Madurese as well.
27
Such participation significantly buttressed FKPM efforts to lead
mobilized Malays up and down the coast killing and expelling Madurese. All told, the
violence lasted from mid February to early April. It claimed hundreds of lives, many killed
in gruesome fashion. As significant, a combination of FKPM, mobilized Dayaks and
security forces thoroughly cleansed some 50,000 Madurese from Sambas.
28
Not a single
local official interviewed or organization condemned the cleansing. In contrast, most
officials and, of course, FKPM leaders, suggested that Madurese--uniformly depicted as
hot-blooded criminals who stubbornly refused to adapt to local customs and norms--
deserved their fate. Drawing its strength from networks of Malay youth and preman who
now run former Madurese rackets, FKPM wields great power locally. For instance,
27
On 16 March, a Dayak was slain outside Pemangkat. Dubious eyewitness accounts finger
Madurese attackers, claims Madurese leaders refute. Nonetheless, this murder triggered Dayak
involvement wherein which the violence spread and grew apace.
28
The IDPs were housed for more than two years in decrepit camps in the provincial capital,
Pontianak. Starting in mid 2002, they began moving out of the camps to build new home on
Pontianak’s outskirts. A return to Sambas still has not been permitted. In addition to the dynamics
mentioned above, the cleansing itself was in part a humanitarian gesture to save lives, although
security forces spent more energies in removing than protecting Madurese; in part to “solve” the
chronic ethnic unrest once and for all; and in part to safeguard the upcoming 1999 elections
which local elite needed to divide the spoils of office.