4
Van Dijk 2001; O’Rourke 2002). If we take Robison’s twin notion of social power and
social conflict seriously, then center-periphery relations must be engaged to complete the
political picture of Indonesia’s transition. In fact, in the early post-Suharto state,
Indonesia’s periphery has hosted the country’s most graphic “processes of social conflict.”
Extensive and intensive regional violence is arguably present Indonesia’s preeminent
feature.
Dynamics of this transitioning state--emasculated state institutions, a decrepit
legal system, a corruptible and understaffed police force, a fractionalized army that benefits
from mass violence by justifying its self-perception as the nation’s natural guardian and
sole guarantor of security, the politicization of ethno-religious identities, competitive party
politics, increasing unemployment, burgeoning black market economies, and a program of
decentralization which devolves significant administrative and fiscal authority to the
regions--has precipitated a spate of mass, civilian violence, while concurrently
emboldening separatist movements. As a result of such violence, as of mid-2001,
Indonesia housed an estimated 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Tempo,
June 17, 2001). And with the army’s rural de-population campaign currently underway in
an effort to exterminate Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) rebels,
IDPs there alone will reach or surpass half this number.
Thus, in this paper, like Robison, I strive to spotlight the limitations of the
transition literature. But unlike Robison, I offer critical evidence from Indonesia’s regions
to demonstrate this literature’s preoccupation with formal institutions and elite bargaining
in national capitals (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; DiPalma 1990; Przeworski 1991;
Casper and Taylor 1996). In an attempt to disaggregate the state (Migdal 2001) into
Convention