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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p62896_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Butler, Christopher. and Bellman, Mary. "Bargaining in a Spatial Context: An Experimental Study" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p62896_index.html>

Butler, C. K. and Bellman, M. J. , 2003-08-27 "Bargaining in a Spatial Context: An Experimental Study" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p62896_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Spatial modeling is a mainstay of formal theory applied to committees, legislatures, the electorate, and--more recently--international relations. Bargaining within a spatial context dates back to Edgeworth in Economics but has often been ambiguous in that numerous points along the contract curve are equally likely. Part of the difficulty of using an issue space within a bargaining model is that more specific point solutions are sensitive to various assumptions. Three well-known cooperative bargaining solutions are the Nash (1950), the Kalai-Smorodonski (1975), and the Felsenthal-Diskin (1982) bargaining solutions. Each of these only depend on the structure of the utility space, but each relies on different assumptions, therefore often resulting in different point predictions, especially within the unidimensional spatial context. We conducted a face-to-face experiment between thirty-four pairings of men, all presented with the same bargaining problem in different contexts. For each pairing, we collected data on a trial bargaining period under a "classic" Nash bargaining problem (under private information, but without monetary incentive) and two bargaining periods with an underlying unidimensional issue space (one under private information, the other under full information, each with monetary incentive). While the Nash bargaining solution was consistently chosen under the "classic" Nash bargaining problem, it was rarely chosen when the bargaining problem represented an underlying unidimensional issue space (under private or full information). For the unidimensional bargaining problem, private information did not facilitate producing any consistent outcome; under full information, the "equity point"--in which each participant earned the same dollar amount--was chosen significantly more often than any other outcome.

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