1
I
NTRODUCTION
Given a bargaining situation with many mutually improving potential agreements, which
agreement will be struck? This research will test the disparate theoretical predictions in the
bargaining literature on such a bargaining problem using information conditions as a critical
intervening variable. A number of theoretical models in Political Science rely on an underlying
“issue space” (e.g., the Liberal-Conservative dimension) that can be abstracted to a number line.
Given actors’ “ideal positions” along this issue space (which may be generated through
experience or socialization for a substantive issue) and a point that represents the “status quo”
(e.g., the current policy being implemented), there are many points that represent mutually
beneficial bargaining agreements. There is little agreement in the literature on which of these
points is most likely to be the outcome of negotiations.
L
ITERATURE
The Economic literature on bargaining experiments may be classified by (1) the number
of parties involved, (2) the sequence of bargaining, and (3) the structure of bargaining—e.g.,
arbitration, simultaneous offers, ultimatum, etc. (cf. Roth 1995). Each of the three elements
varies from study to study, with information conditions having different degrees of prominence.
Pecorino and Van Boening (2001) found that negotiating prior to submitting a final proposal for
arbitration—i.e., increasing information between the disputants—decreases the dispute rate.
Sopher (1994) uses a simultaneous-offers game to find experimental evidence of suboptimal
concession behavior in the second of two bargaining rounds—implying a failure to reach
agreement on the first round and implicit learning behavior—in order to guarantee positive
payment in the second round. Kuhn and Gu (1999) find empirical evidence that negotiations
Convention