8
Figure 3 plots the bargaining problem into the Nash bargaining space. The line indicates
the range of outcomes that were available (in 25¢ increments) on the payoff schedule. The
circles indicate the special points (as in Figure 1).
[Figure 3 about here]
Justification of Selecting Males Only
The experimental bargaining literature has shown sex-difference effects in various
studies. For example, a phenomenon dubbed the “Chivalry effect” has been noted for the
ultimatum game (Eckel and Grossman 2001) in which (1) a male Proposer is likely to offer more
to a female than to a male and (2) a male is more likely to accept a low proposal from a female
than from a male. As with other aspects of the ultimatum game, this effect does not directly spill
over to other bargaining structures (such as the one under examination here). Other research on
sex effects in bargaining experiments have shown that women are less likely to receive a
favorably outcome when paired with a man compared with a same-sex pairing of women (King
and Hinson 1994; Solnick 2001). The general explanation for this is to posit that women are
more cooperative while men are more competitive (following Gilligan 1982). This has been
corroborated by Nowell and Tinkler (1994) and Ortmann and Tichy (1999). However, contrary
evidence has been presented by Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), and no difference found by
Orbell, Dawes, and Schwartz-Shea (1994) and Cadsby and Maynes (1998).
Given this simple assumption of sex-based behavioral differences, one may expect the
following differences in outcomes in the proposed bargaining experiment. First, female-female
pairings will be more likely to reach the equity point regardless of information condition.
Convention