(Page 19 of 31) - Beyond Choice and Responsibility: Equality and Women's Choices authored by Kim, Hee-Kang.

morally arbitrary social context,” then those preferences are not categorized as “authentic,” “ideally

considered,” and “voluntary” for Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen

; if the caretakers’ choices resulting

from those preferences are not considered as autonomous, these theorists would not hold dependent

caretakers responsible for the costs of choices made on the basis of such preferences. In such cases,

Kaufman argues that, in contrast to Anderson, luck egalitarianism does provide for public assistance to

dependent caretakers even though their disadvantaged situations are the outcomes of their choices.

I do agree with Kaufman that Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen provide a more subtle and

profound principle of equality than Anderson ascribes to them. I also do agree with Kaufman that all

three theorists carefully define the range of autonomous choices for the cost of which a person should

be held responsible, doing so by acknowledging the possibility that the formation of preference is

influenced, to a significant degree, by arbitrary circumstantial factors.

In other words, I find that that

Ibid., p. 15.

I think, however, that whether the preferences of the dependent caretakers are actually classified as “deformed

preferences” – unauthentic, not ideally considered, and involuntary preferences that Dworkin, Arneson, and
Cohen enumerate – and whether the caretakers are entitled to public assistance, as Kaufman claim, are different
questions. For example, Dworkin’s authenticity principle focuses on legal circumstances under which people’s
preferences are formed. In describing the principle of authenticity, Dworkin distinguishes his idea of authenticity
from “metaphysical” or “psychological” authenticity. He emphasizes that his idea of authenticity is only
concerned with the “absence of legal constraints” in forming a person’s personality. Considering that the
preferences of dependent caretakers are largely influenced by socioeconomic and cultural factors rather than
legal factors, those of the dependent caretakers are properly not considered as “authentic” in Dworkin’s scheme,
unlike Kaufman claims (see Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 483). Regarding Cohen’s theory, Kaufman
categorizes the preferences of dependent caretakers as those of “commitments.” He claims that the preferences
of the dependent caretakers are not “intrinsically connected” to the disadvantages they experience: the dependent
caretakers identify with their obligation to provide care, not with the disadvantages. Kaufman concludes that
Cohen’s theory thus provides public assistance for the dependent caretakers. I agree with Kaufman that the
preferences of dependent caretakers are closely classified as commitments Cohen specializes. The caretakers,
mostly women, often involuntarily retain the beliefs and values of commitment with upbringing in gender-biased
family and society, rather than choose them freely. I contend, however, that whether the disadvantages are
“intrinsically connected” to their preferences is an ultimately problematic question because of uncertainty and
complexity from which Cohen’s theory suffers. I contend that Cohen’s idea of “intrinsically connectedness” is a
very vague concept that he does not closely define. For example, the caretakers may or may not think that their
preferences for taking care of dependents are inevitably tied to the disadvantages that they experience. It is
difficult to give a concrete answer for this. Arneson’s case is also problematic. Kaufman provides two instances:
one is the preferences of dependent caretakers that are “ideally considered” and other is those that are not
“ideally considered.” According to Kaufman, Arneson’s theory views that the caretakers will be entitled to
public assistance in both instances. While I agree with him on the first instance, I do not agree with him on the
second instance. Kaufman claims that the determining factor for the second instance is the failure of equal
opportunity for welfare. He says that if the dependent caretaker’s best option, based on their ideally considered
preferences, is inferior to the best options of other members of society, equal opportunity of welfare provides
public assistance to the dependent caretakers. Otherwise, equal opportunity for welfare would fail its main