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govern themselves by their own principles and rules and thus become autonomous. Dworkin, Arneson,
and Cohen all have the same goal in their equality theories.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the equality theories of Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen and shown
how and why their equality theories do not properly address a set of issues of women who are situated
both at work and in the family. Throughout the paper, I have agreed with Dworkin, Arneson, and
Cohen on their views of the relationship between equality and autonomy. As these theorists rightly
demonstrate, equality is not in conflict with the notion of autonomy; but rather, it is compatible with
autonomy. I have criticized, however, their concepts of autonomous choice and personal responsibility
for failing adequately to consider the autonomy of women. I have argued that a feminist understanding
of autonomy requires encompassing the concepts of the social self and social responsibility. Despite
the merit of the equality theories of Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen in providing an innovative view on
the relationship between equality and autonomy, I conclude, a full theory of equality requires
reformulating their conceptualizations of autonomy, so that it properly takes into account the issue
most concerning women in relating to family and work in current society.