9
review the theories of Locke, Smith, and Kant and their accounts on religion and public life. And
finally, I discuss how these theories can be incorporated into the theoretical body of political
liberalism.
II. Conceptual Themes (1): Problems of Comprehensive Liberalism
To a religious person, the idea of individual as free, equal, and reasonable, may appear
more or less challenging depending on the extent to which the limits of these notions are extended
to various spheres of life. In this line, liberalism whose normative claims extend to all of human
life is called comprehensive liberalism. Comprehensive liberalism is often associated with the
Enlightenment: liberation of human beings from externally imposed authorities, particularly from
the authority of religion. Reason is thought to replace religion and tradition as the prime source of
authority. The limits of state authority, or the principle of legitimacy that underlies this authority,
is justified by reference to a particular view of morality which emphasizes human autonomy and
individualism.
Two particular liberal thinkers associated with this view are Immanuel Kant
3
and John
Stuart Mill. For Kant, every man is entitled to respect from every other man; in return he owes all
of them respect. A human being cannot be treated, even by himself, as means and but only as an
end. Persons are owed respect for their autonomy, their own freely and rationally adopted moral
policy. Accordingly constitutional principles should protect this supreme value of human
autonomy by inviolable rights (1996 [1794]). Mill, on the other hand, emphasized the notion of
individualism, which is somewhat a more radical treatment of the notion of human autonomy, if
not its logical consequence. For Mill the individual is prior to society, but not the individual as he
is, rather the individual as he may become with proper education in a well-organized society. The
only thing of ultimate value, Mill argues, is the happiness of individuals; and, individuals can best
3
As in his ethical liberalism. See note 2.