Evaluating the charge of utopianism requires us to make some distinctions. Giovanni Sartori
complains that critics of utopia frequently fail to distinguish between ideals and utopias. For him, an ideal
is a realizable state of affairs that has not been realized. A utopia is an impossible state of affairs that can,
nevertheless, be imagined and attempted – usually with disastrous consequences.
64
This is an important
distinction, but it requires qualifications.
Sartori insists that “realizing” an ideal is an ambiguous matter. We can “optimize” an ideal like
political equality by realizing as much of it as is compatible with other values such as liberty. We cannot
“maximize” most ideals without destroying them. The ideal of “all power to all people” is not capable of
realization unless there is only one person.
The notion of “possibility” is equally ambiguous. Sartori rails against the “withering away of the
sense of the impossible” that characterized the utopian politics of the New Left during the Sixties.
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Politics
is the art of the possible, and when we lose our ability to discriminate between what is possible and what is
impossible, we destroy the conditions for meaningful political life. Sartori is right about that, but asserting
this leaves us with two problems (one of which Sartori is aware).
First, political judgment requires us to think of possibility as something other than avoiding
contradictions or violating the terms of some metaphysical system. “Possible” must mean possible in
particular circumstances. That ties the notion of possibility to standards of evidence. What is possible is
what our evidence permits us to believe. Such an epistemological conception of possibility is bound to be
controversial. We could tie our standards of evidence to canonical research in the social sciences, but
Sartori realizes that what we know from standard social science evidence is neither compelling nor
complete enough to guide our judgments. We need to stretch our conception of evidence to test our
critiques of political arrangements.
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Second, Sartori is insufficiently aware of the limits to affirming possibility as a standard for
judgment. He offers a powerful critique of totalitarian movements and regimes inspired by utopian visions.
The swath of destruction accompanying these movements during the Twentieth Century was indeed
breathtaking. What Sartori misses is the role of utopian movements within liberal democracies that have not
had a serious chance of replacing liberal regimes. To “attempt the impossible” is not necessarily a political
evil. Unrealistic political demands can be tempered by the give and take of political competition.
Furthermore, impossible dreams can be negotiated down to manageable reforms. One need not believe with
Fourier that the seas can be turned to lemonade to recognize practical applications for Fourier.
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Utopian
visions are an important part of the quest for right order, and we should not succumb to the sort of utopia-
phobia that seeks to excise them.
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Nature and utopia must be held in tension. We need to resist both and use both to resist politics.
That requires us to respect empirical inquiry. We cannot simply assume our naturlessness. We must
constantly ask ourselves if we are pushing ourselves beyond our limits without expecting any a priori
guidance on what might count as an answer.
64
Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate (Chatham,
NJ: Chatham House, 1987), 58-85.
65
Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, 60-64.
66
Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, 77-82.
67
Paul Goodman, Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals (New York: Vintage, 1951); Frank E. Manuel,
The Prophets of Paris: Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Comte (New York: Harper and Row,
1962); Frank E. Manuel, ed. Utopias and Utopian Thought (Boston: Beacon, 1965); Lewis Mumford, The
Story of Utopias, New York: Viking, 1962); Judith Shklar, After Utopia: the Decline of Political Faith
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
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For a good example of utopia-phobia, see Thomas Molnar, Utopia: The Perennial Heresy, (New York:
1967). Molnar never asserts that we can eradicate utopian impulse -- to do so would be utopian. Rather, he
systematically ignores the distinction between utopia as a totalizing drive backed by a state (or multi-state)
apparatus or a radical political movement and utopia as a necessary counter-point to a politics of smugness.
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