9
Other characteristics include proportional representation, and minority veto power in
order to protect minority rights.
In some respects consociationalism can be seen as extreme proportionality. Its
purpose is to alleviate grievances among groups by providing those groups with a clear
voice in government. Proportional representation attempts to do the same, though does
not rely on ethnic divisions to provide the voice.
Though Lijphart and others have proposed consociationalism as a solution to
political violence within democratic boarders it seems to apply only to a small segment of
democratic governments: those that are deeply divided alone ethnic lines. In fact, some
have suggested the only successful alternative to consociationalism is partition (Lijphart
1977; O’Leary 1989). This demonstrates how divided these societies must be.
Consociationalism may be a solution only in these highly divided societies. Such
division is unlikely in the 18 developed democracies that I am analyzing in this study.
However, my theoretical argument as to why the number of effective parties may
alleviate violence is sympathetic to Lijphart reasoning behind why consociationalism
reduces violence.
However, even if consociationalism is a solution to violence it too remains largely
atheoretic. Essentially, Lijphart identifies what conditions reduce violence and suggests
following that model. His suggestion is derived by looking at factors (majoritarianism)
that increase political violence and then saying to try and reduce those factors. This may
be a correct diagnosis but it still lacks a theoretical reason as to why majoritarian systems
promote violence.
Convention