.
2
To even the most casual observer of British politics, such observations would suggest a
government facing considerable trouble. To more seasoned analysts, such conditions are quite
remarkable. They indicate a considerable reversal of fortunes for the country’s most popular
prime minister in decades, and, perhaps more importantly, for a party that successfully
engineered two of the largest electoral landslides in modern British politics. Blair’s Labour
government between 1997 and 2003 enjoyed an unprecedentedly smooth ride, with very few
bumps in the road. In particular, since coming to power in 1997 the Blair government has not
been confronted with any serious domestic difficulties over foreign policy. The first seven
months of 2003 arguably ushered in a new and much more difficult era for Blair and his
government. Are we now at the end of the party’s period of political ascendancy? Or are the
conditions that the Blair government faces today what any government encounters at its
midpoint?
Backing the United States with respect to Iraq has left Blair politically exposed—both in
the eyes of the British public and within his own political party. By deciding to so closely ally
himself to the Bush administration, the prime minister has placed himself in some political
jeopardy. Conventional wisdom is that the Blair government will survive and get re-elected to a
third term. At the moment, this seems a reasonable assumption, given that the opposition
parties—both Conservative and Liberal Democratic—continue to fail to muster their forces in
credible fashion. However, the next election is still a considerable way off and political fortunes
can change quickly—there is no such thing as a sure thing in politics. Thus, in this paper I
speculate as to the effects Blair’s Iraq policy will have on his leadership of and control over his
party, the party’s electoral fortunes, and his ability to implement key domestic reforms. Did the
debate on the Iraq war, the conflict itself and its aftermath provide an opportunity for Blair to