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8
been unheard of before this point (no one dared contemplate interfering with, or going against,
the Blair electoral machine).
So, Blair contemplated the first House of Commons vote on military action against Iraq
at a low, if not the lowest, point in his government’s fortunes. He found himself in a seemingly
precarious position both within the ranks of the Labour Party as well as with respect to the public
at large. Importantly, there had been very few moments, if any, since 1997 when this government
had approached a vote in such a tenuous or uncertain position—and this hardly seemed the ideal
issue on which to test the waters. Further, foreign policy-making is an area in which
parliamentary consultation is highly unusual because it is generally not considered to be
necessary because it is a matter of “high politics.” The fact that such a decision was even coming
to a vote was some indication of the trouble the prime minister was facing.
The House of Commons vote on February 26 was considered to be the parliament’s last
chance to register its feelings about the war before British troops were committed to action. On
this date, MPs voted on the war twice. First, on a motion backing United Nations Resolution
1441 and calling on Iraq “to recognize this as its final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations" and second, on an all-party amendment declaring that "this house finds
the case for military action against Iraq as yet unproven." Between them, the motion and the
amendment presented members of parliament with a very clear choice on the key argument of
the day—should the government pursue a war with Iraq or not?
When the results of the vote were tallied, the government’s motion passed by a vote of
434 to 124. Yet, victory had a price. The Blair government had suffered the worst rebellion of its
premiership, with 122 Labour MPs—or more than a third of this party—defying the party’s
three-line whip. This was the biggest revolt against a governing party for more than a century.
Convention