19
problem separately, step by step, taking inspiration sometimes from history, sometimes
from theory, experience, and the discussions with his fellow citizens.
31
Sound political
judgment requires the capacity to understand the unique nature of political phenomena
and actors’ intentions. The committed observer knows that it is a great error to speak of
political things “absolutely and indiscriminately and to deal with them, as it were, by the
book” (Guicciardini 1972, 42). Instead, he insists that in nearly all things one must make
prudent distinctions and exceptions because circumstances change and new
circumstances always require new approaches. To judge by the book would amount to a
serious misunderstanding of political life, because every tiny difference in each case
always has significant, large-scale effects. Or, to discern these small differences requires
a perspicacious eye and sound discernment, since political affairs cannot be judged from
an Archimedian point away from the sound and fury of the world, but ought to be
resolved and considered day by day, step by step, here and now.
ARON’S POLITICAL MODERATION
Raised in the political tradition of Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville, Aron’s
intellectual and political trajectory is an excellent example of a moderate committed
observer who sought a healthy middle between extremes.
32
He once described himself as
31
Aron 1997, 303.
32
Chapter Four of Anderson’s book on Aron, entitled “Antinomic Prudence” (Anderson 1997, 121-68)
offers a nuanced interpretation of Aron’s political moderation. On this issue, also see Mahoney 1992, 111-
28; 137-46.
Convention