39
The ideal proposed by the Aronian school of moderation is the political
philosopher who has a deep knowledge of history, a keen understanding of politics, the
will to know the truth and the ability to make a decision and to act upon it. He
understands well the seminal role played by irrational emotions in politics and is
convinced that “to reflect upon politics, one must be as rational as possible, but to be
active in them, one must inevitably play upon the emotions of other men. (Aron 1997,
33). He also has the ability to understand the way others think because, as a critical
thinker, he remains independent and detached. As such, Aronian skepticism designates a
form of philosophical reflection on politics that does not let the intellectuals’
characteristic romantic (or utopian) attitude toward politics to get the better of their sense
of reality.
58
Yet, moderation has its own limitations and one of them stems from the belief that
everything can be reconciled through negotiation and compromise and by being
reasonable; that exceptional measures are never necessary because they jeopardize
principled action. Fortunately, Aron was not of this opinion. He was aware of the
antinomies, paradoxes and tragic choices in politics and understood that some conflicts
are irreconcilable and may sometimes have tragic consequences.
59
It is Aron’s moderation that makes him relevant today, in an eclectic age when
doctrines and ideas are again mixed, after having lost their previous sharp contours and
identities. The age of extremes, one can only hope, is over, and with it also disappears the
notion of politics as “the pursuit of certainty.” Much like Aron and his predecessors
(Tocqueville, Guizot), we are again called to philosophize with the compass and must
58
See Aron 1997, 45-6.
59
See Aron 1997, 224. On Aron’s probabilistic and prudential science of politics, see Mahoney 1992, 111-
22.
Convention